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T HE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT in 1949 held that restrictive
covenants and agreements based upon racial discrimination
are unenforceable by court action. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S.
1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161.
At that time a collateral question arose concerning which
there appeared to be a difference of opinion among attorneys,
both locally and elsewhere. The same difference of opinion de-
veloped later among state courts.
The question was this: In view of the holding in the Shelley
case, can the grantor in a deed have recourse to the courts to
enforce a stipulated penalty contained in a discriminatory racial
covenant (such as payment of damages or forfeiture of title) if
the enforcement of such penalty does not directly involve the
constitutional rights of third persons?
The matter now seems to be pretty well resolved by the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U. S. 249, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. 527. Factually the case may
not be exactly in point because no stipulated penalty for breach
was apparently involved, but the reasoning upon which the deci-
sion is based would seemingly apply.
The case originated in California and was an action for
damages growing out of the alleged violation by respondent of
a written agreement between respondent and other parties who
owned properties in the same neighborhood by the terms of
which all parties bound themselves, their heirs, executors, ad-
ministrators, successors and assigns that no part of their respec-
tive properties should at any time be used or occupied by anyone
not wholly of the white or Caucasian race and that such restric-
tion should be incorporated in all transfers of their properties.
Petitioners, being owners of properties covered by said agree-
ment, claimed that respondent violated the agreement by failing
to include the restriction in a deed conveying her property and
by permitting non-Caucasians to move in and occupy the prem-
ises.
Basing their decision on the ruling in the Shelley case, the
California courts sustained a demurrer to petitioners' complaint
and the United States Supreme Court, by a six to one division,
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affirmed this judgment, two members of the court taking no part
in the consideration of the case or in the decision.
The majority of the court reasoned (in part) as follows:
To compel respondent to respond in damages would be solely for
the purpose of giving vitality to the restrictive covenant in ques-
tion by punishing respondent for failure to discriminate against
non-Caucasians in the use of her property; to that extent the
State would put its sanction behind such covenants and respond-
ent would be coerced to continue to use her property in a dis-
criminatory manner, so that it would become not respondent's
voluntary choice but the State's choice that she observe her
covenant or suffer damages; that for a state court at law thus to
sanction the validity of such a covenant would constitute state
action as surely as it would be state action to enforce such
covenants in equity. In view of all of which, the Court stated
that it would not permit or require California thus to penalize
respondent for failure to observe a restrictive covenant which
California would not be permitted to enforce in equity or to in-
corporate in a statute.
The Court held further that even though no non-Caucasian
was before the Court claiming to have been denied his con-
stitutional rights, an award of damages would deprive non-
Caucasians, "unidentified but identifiable," of equal protection
of laws in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution, because such award would have the effect of rendering
non-Caucasian "would-be users of restricted land" unable to
own and enjoy property on the same terms as Caucasians, solely
because of their race.
The Court also held that there was such close relationship
between the sanctioning by a state court of the punishment of
respondent for not going forward with her covenant and the
purpose of the covenant itself, that the situation called for re-
laxation of the rule which ordinarily precludes a person from
challenging the constitutionality of state action by invoking the
rights of others.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson filed a dissenting opinion based on
the ground that there was no identifiable non-Caucasian before
the Court who would be denied the right to buy, occupy or
otherwise enjoy the properties in the law suit, or any other prop-
erty, or whose rights would be impaired by requiring respondent
to pay for the injury which it was claimed she had brought upon
petitioners.
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